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CLUMSY SOLUTIONS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 
 
Michael Thompson and Marco Verweij 
 
 
Most climatologists agree that by burning fossil fuels and engaging in other forms of 
consumption and production we are increasing the amount of greenhouse gases that float 
around in the atmosphere. These gases, in trapping some of the sun’s heat, warm the earth 
and enable life. The trouble is, some predict, that if we continue to accumulate those 
gases, over the course of the new century the average temperature on earth will rise and 
local climates will change, with possibly catastrophic consequences. Will this indeed 
happen? If so, should we do something about it? And if yes, what and when? Does 
climate change put the future of the world at risk? Can only a radical reallocation of 
global wealth and power rescue us from this threat? Or should people not be overly 
worried, as the steady march of technological progress will see us through in the end? 
In our view, people do not offer a great many different answers to such questions. 
In fact, we argue that the various ways in which people understand a phenomenon like 
global warming are derived from a strictly limited number of alternative perceptions of 
reality. These alternative ways of perceiving the world justify, represent, and emerge 
from alternative ways of organizing social relations. In this introduction we claim that 
successful solutions to pressing social ills consist of creative and flexible combinations of 
these different ways of organizing, perceiving and social relations. This claim is at the 
heart of what we have come to call ‘clumsiness’, and is illustrated in the rest of the issue. 
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The current landscape of the social sciences can for our present purposes be 
divided roughly into two camps. One camp is built on the assumption that human beings 
are fundamentally the same. Rational choice theory –or the economic approach to social 
analysis– is a major contender from this camp. Via its ‘homogeneity assumption,’ this 
approach posits that all individuals are similarly rational, or self-interested. The second 
camp harbors a contrary position: the only goal to which social scientists can truly aspire 
is to document how every person, community, and epoch is incomparably different from 
other people, communities, and epochs. Post-structuralism, for instance, explicitly rejects 
making generalizations about social life on the grounds that such an exercise would 
always do injustice to the uniqueness of people and cultures. But also many of those who 
have not embraced post-structuralist tenets have ended up arguing that social scientists 
can only uncover causal relationships that are entirely local and temporary.1
We feel that both of these edifices sit on shaky foundations. In view of the 
cultural and social variety across time and space, it seems implausible to insist that all 
individuals merely follow a single rationality. It is not possible to explain social 
differences –for instance, why war or poverty reigns here and now but not there and 
then– merely on the basis of human universals. If everybody were similarly rational or 
self-interested, then this factor could not explain any differences between cases; 
ironically, by assuming that everyone is similarly rational or self-interested, rationality 
and self-interest are ruled out as explanatory factors in any comparative analysis. Yet if it 
were true that individuals were wholly different from each other, how could we ever 
manage to communicate across cultures, understand history, cooperate, and interpret new 
events?2 In the words of Isaiah Berlin: 
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As for the issue of relativity and the subjective nature of values, I wonder whether this 
has not, for the sake of argument, been exaggerated by philosophers: whether men and 
their outlooks have differed, over wide stretches of space and time, as greatly as has at 
times been represented. … If values had varied very widely between cultures and periods, 
communication would have been harder to achieve, and our historical knowledge, which 
depends on some degree of ability to understand the goals and motives and ways of life at 
work in cultures different from our own, would turn out to be an illusion.3
 
Fortunately, we don’t have to choose between these two extreme positions. It is possible 
–at least in principle– to distinguish simultaneously between a limited number of social 
and cultural forms, and still recognize wide social and cultural variety. Physics has 
maintained that all the material objects that we can observe on earth and beyond consist 
of endlessly varying combinations of only six basic particles (or, in more recent 
formulations, a small number of strings). Analogously, it might be possible to discern a 
limited number of fundamental forms of social organization from which a large variety of 
ultimate forms of social and cultural life can be derived. This is the starting point of what 
we have come to call cultural theory.4
The original aim of this theory was to devise a typology of social forms that fit –
to the extent possible– the classificatory schemes developed by the grand old social 
theorists (Durkheim, Tönnies, Maine, Weber, etc.), as well as the evidence collected in 
subsequent ethnographic studies.5 According to our cultural theory, there are four 
primary ways of organizing, perceiving, and justifying social relations (usually called 
‘ways of life,’ or ‘social solidarities’): egalitarianism, hierarchy, individualism and 
fatalism. 
We postulate that these four ways of life are in conflict in every conceivable 
domain of social life. Most such domains (say the way in which a school operates, or the 
way in which an international regime functions) will consist of some dynamic 
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combination of these pure forms. As many social domains can be distinguished within 
and between societies (and as many societies can be distinguished around the world), the 
theory allows one to perceive a wide and ever-changing cultural and social variety – 
while still enabling one to formulate general propositions about social and political life. 
These propositions include possible ways in which people perceive and attempt to stave 
off a threat such as climate change. In order to explain and illustrate this, we will have to 
set out our cultural theory in some detail. 
Each of the four ways of life consists of a specific way of structuring social 
relations and a supporting cast of particular beliefs, values, emotions, perceptions, and 
interests.6 Our fourfold typology is strictly derived from two dimensions of sociality: 
what we will call ‘grid’ and ‘group’.7 Grid measures the extent to which role 
differentiation constrains the behavior of individuals: where roles are primarily ascribed, 
grid constraints are high; where roles are primarily a matter of choice, grid constraints are 
low. Group, by contrast, measures the extent to which an overriding commitment to a 
social unit constrains the thought and action of individuals. 
High-group strength results when people devote a lot of their available time to 
interacting with other members of their unit. In general, the more things they do together, 
and the longer they spend doing them, the higher the group strength. Where admission to 
the social unit is hard to obtain, making the unit more exclusive and conscious of its 
boundary, the group strength also tends to be high. An extreme case of high group 
strength is the monastic community whose members renounce their private property upon 
entering and depend on the corporate body for all their material and social needs. High-
group strength of this sort requires a long-term commitment and a tight identification of 
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members with one another as a corporate identity. Individuals are expected to act on 
behalf of the collective whole, and the corporate body is expected to act in the normative 
interests of its members. 
Group strength is low when people negotiate their way through life on their own 
behalves as individuals, neither constrained by, nor reliant upon, a single group of others. 
Instead, low-group people interact as individuals with other individuals, picking and 
choosing with whom they will associate, as their present preoccupations and perceived 
interests demand. The low-group experience is a competitive, entrepreneurial way of life 
where the individual is not strongly constrained by duty to other persons. Attractive 
though this freedom from constraint might first appear to some, there is a serious 
disadvantage: in a low group context, you cannot count on the support of your fellows 
should your personal fortune wane. In the high-group context, the safety net of social 
support compensates for the loss of personal autonomy. 
Grid stands for the complementary bundle of constraints on social interaction. 
Grid is high whenever roles are distributed on the basis of explicit public social 
classifications, such as gender, color, position in a hierarchy, holding a bureaucratic 
office, descent in a senior clan or lineage, or point of progression through an age-grade 
system. It is low when classificatory distinctions only weakly limit the range of social 
choices and activities open to people. A low-grid social environment is one in which 
access to roles depends on personal abilities to compete or negotiate for them, or even on 
formal regulations that ensure equal access and opportunity to compete. In either case, 
access to roles is not dependent on any ascribed characteristics of rank or birth. 
Assigning two values (high and low)8 to the grid and group dimensions gives the 
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four ways of organizing, perceiving and justifying social relations. Egalitarianism is 
associated with a low-grid score and a high-group score. The combination of a high score 
on the grid dimension (many rules prescribing people’s roles) with a high score on the 
group dimension (strong group boundaries) gives the hierarchical way. The third way of 
organizing and justifying social relations, individualism, is associated with low scores on 
both the grid and group scales. Last, fatalism is characterized by a high-grid and a low-
group score. 
We are now in a position to describe how these four different forms of association 
tend to produce different ways of perceiving nature (including human nature), and the 
policy prescriptions that follow from that. In an egalitarian social setting, actors see 
nature as fragile, intricately interconnected and ephemeral, and man as essentially caring 
(until corrupted by coercive institutions such as markets and hierarchies). We must all 
tread lightly on the earth, and it is not enough that people start off equal; they must end 
up equal as well – equality of result. Trust and leveling go hand-in-hand, and institutions 
that distribute unequally are distrusted. Voluntary simplicity is the only solution to our 
environmental problems, with the Precautionary Principle being strictly enforced on 
those who are tempted not to share the simple life. 
In a hierarchical social setting, actors see the world as controllable. Nature is 
stable until pushed beyond discoverable limits, and man is malleable: deeply flawed but 
redeemable by firm, long-lasting, and trustworthy institutions. Fair distribution is by rank 
and station or, in the modern context, by need (with the level of need being determined 
by expert and dispassionate authority). Environmental management requires certified 
experts to determine the precise locations of nature’s limits, and statutory regulation to 
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ensure that all economic activity is kept within those limits. 
In an individualistic social setting, actors view nature as benign and resilient –able 
to recover from any exploitation– and man as inherently self-seeking and atomistic. Trial 
and error, in self-organizing ego-focused networks (unfettered markets), is the way to go, 
with Adam Smith’s invisible hand ensuring that people only do well when others also 
benefit. The upholders of individualistic solidarity, in consequence, trust others until they 
give them reason not to and then retaliate in kind (the winning ‘tit for tat’ strategy in the 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game), and see it as only fair that (as in the joint stock 
company) those who put the most in get the most out. They think institutions that work 
with the grain of the market (that get rid of environmentally harmful subsidies, for 
instance) are what are needed. 
In a fatalistic social setting, finally, actors find neither rhyme nor reason in nature, 
and suppose that man is fickle and untrustworthy. Fairness is not to be found in this life, 
and there is no possibility of effecting change for the better. ‘Defect first’ –the winning 
strategy in the one-off prisoner’s dilemma– makes sense here, given the unreliability of 
communication and the permanent absence of prior acts of good faith. Without the 
possibility of ever getting in sync with nature, or of building trust with others, the 
fatalistic world unlike the three others is one in which learning is impossible. ‘Why 
bother?’ therefore is the rational management response. 
Since it was first formulated, this classification of four different ways of 
organizing and perceiving social relations has helped illuminate the paradoxical and 
sometimes contradictory ways in which people approach contemporary public policy 
issues. Indeed, these solidarities, in varying strengths and patterns of pairwise alliance, 
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are discernible almost anywhere you care to look: in debates over the wisdom of 
prescribing safety seat belts, in the international fora where delegates struggle to do 
something about climate change, in the different ways international regimes cope with 
transboundary risks such as water pollution, municipalities go about the business of 
transport planning and hospitals treat nuclear waste, in the various ways households set 
about making ends meet and public authorities treat the mentally ill, in the different 
diagnoses of the pensions crisis in countries with ageing populations, and in the different 
panaceas that are variously championed and rejected by theorists of public 
administration, to mention but a few.9
What is remarkable about all these divergent examples is that they cannot be 
pinned down to a single level of social organization, or ‘level of analysis’ – indeed they 
range all the way from individual households to global institutions. Cultural theory 
assumes social life to be of a fractal nature.10 That is to say, the same four forms of 
organizing and perceiving are supposed to be interacting –forever merging, splitting and 
recombining– in unpredictable ways at each conceivable level of social organization 
(e.g., families, firms, ministries or football clubs), with the patterns that result within the 
domains at one level of society combining to form the same four ways of organizing and 
perceiving within the domains at a higher level of society (e.g., the system of interest 
representation within a country, or an international regime). Thus, four straightforward 
organizational principles can create an endlessly changing, infinitely varied and complex 
social world.11
Some will argue that this typology represents nothing new. Derived from 
classifications proposed by the founding fathers of the social sciences, it also overlaps 
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with a host of more recent categorizations. These would include the typical reactions to 
decline that Hirschman has described (exit, loyalty and voice), the patterns of economic 
action that Polyani has pointed out (market, redistribution and reciprocity), the sorts of 
‘goods’ distinguished by Snidal (private goods, public goods, common pool resources 
and club goods), the systems of interest representation set out by Schmitter (pluralism, 
corporatism, syndicalism and monism), McKinlay and Little’s liberal, realist and socialist 
international systems, Lichbach’s solutions to collective problems (market & contract, 
hierarchy and community) – not to mention the many times that social scientists have 
proposed to add a third type to Weber’s classical distinction between market and 
bureaucracy: collegiums (Majone), community (Schmitter and Streeck; Perrow; Miller; 
Etzioni), trust (Granovetter; Bradach and Eccles), society (Wiesenthal), clans (Ouchi), 
forum (Elster) or civil society (e.g., Seligman).12
We agree with this assertion, but do not see the overlap as a drawback of cultural 
theory. On the contrary, we feel that these similarities fortify our assumption that human 
relations tend to be organized in a restricted number of ways. Moreover, in comparison to 
other taxonomies, the grid-group classification comes with several advantages. Not only 
does it add a fourth way of organizing to many classifications (usually fatalism), it also 
spells out the basic perceptions that typically underpin alternative ways of organizing. In 
addition, cultural theory’s typology is usually more fine-grained than other classifications 
(being of a fractal nature, it can also be used to distinguish among different types of 
bureaucracies, markets or civil societies), and can be applied to any possible domain of 
human life (from sexual relations to the nuclear arms race). On the basis of these 
characteristics, Harry Eckstein argued that the four ways of life constitute ‘especially 
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promising constructions for cultural typology’ that encapsulate ‘a great many meanings 
into a limited set of supermeanings’.13
Cultural theory has several normative implications.14 First, there is the realization 
that people are arguing from different premises and that, since these premises are 
anchored in different forms of solidarity, they will never agree. Second, in line with the 
‘argumentative turn’ in policy analysis, this contention, as well as being unavoidable, is 
all to the good: something to be harnessed through constructive communication.15 Each 
way of organizing and perceiving distils certain elements of experience and wisdom that 
are missed by the others. Each way of organizing and perceiving provides a clear 
expression of the way in which a significant portion of the populace feels we should live 
with one another and with nature. And each one needs all the others in order to be 
sustainable.16
It is useful to set out this latter point in some detail. Under pure egalitarianism 
there are no peaceful mechanisms, other than an endless search for consensus, for 
deciding between alternative opinions. There is no official leadership that can settle 
issues, nor a voting mechanism that can be invoked. This lack of procedures for settling 
conflicts can easily paralyze egalitarian social settings. It can also give rise to the violent 
expulsion of dissenters. In addition, pure egalitarianism creates social ills by ruling out 
any activities that would give rise to inequality of condition. This limits economic 
production to a bare minimum, as many forms of economic life contain a competitive 
element. Hence, undiluted egalitarianism will have to be mixed with at least minimal 
doses of the other ways of organizing and perceiving, if it is not to evaporate. Hierarchy 
has a whole ‘armory of different solutions to internal conflicts, upgrading, shifting 
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sideways, downgrading, re-segregating and re-defining’ (Douglas 1978: 20). 
Individualism preaches the right of each individual to live according to his or her own 
needs and wants, without group interference. Such enthusiasm for individuality serves to 
dampen the disrespect in which dissenters are held. Together, hierarchy and 
individualism provide many ways in which to increase the resource base of a group of 
people, thus preventing impoverishment. Fatalism is useful for egalitarian organizations, 
as it continuously replenishes the moral outrage that keeps such organizations together. 
Hierarchy, too, needs the others. Without the distrust of central control and 
insistence on transparency that are prevalent within both individualism and 
egalitarianism, hierarchy would be apt to be prey to the classical problems of 
bureaucracy: corruption, arbitrary use of power, tunnel vision, lack of innovativeness, 
and moral fragmentation. And without the unquestioning acceptance and resignation that 
fatalism implies hierarchical control would become impossible. 
Unfettered individualism undermines itself, as it does not include the means to 
enforce contracts and check accumulating inequalities. To keep its playing fields level, an 
individualistic social system needs egalitarian-minded organizations to notice, and 
protest, mounting inequalities. It needs the regulatory capacities of hierarchy in order to 
enforce contracts, as well as to organize the continuous redistribution of resources that 
will keep playing fields level. And what would become of individualistic competition, if 
not a (fatalistic) sucker were born every minute? 
Barry Schwartz has nicely summed up these inter-dependencies: 
Each way of life undermines itself. Individualism would mean chaos without hierarchical 
authority to enforce contracts and repel enemies. To get work done and settle disputes the 
egalitarian order needs hierarchy, too. Hierarchies, in turn, would be stagnant without the 
creative energy of individualism, uncohesive without the binding force of equality, 
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unstable without the passivity and acquiescence of fatalism. Dominant and subordinate 
ways of life thus exist in alliance yet this relationship is fragile, constantly shifting, 
constantly generating a societal environment conducive to change.17
 
It is therefore important that all the ways of life be taken some sort of account of in the 
policy process. And that, for all its simplicity, is the essence of clumsiness: all the 
‘voices’ heard, and responded to by the others. We can now return to the issue of climate 
change, and show how our theory sorts out, and clarifies, the ongoing disputes regarding 
this topic – and what this implies for governance. 
 
The Contested Terrain of Climate Change 
 
Cultural Theory is emphatically a dynamic theory, with its typology identifying the 
timeless components in the ever-changing positions that are the destinations and points of 
departure for all that endless movement. In other words, the precise policies and 
arguments taken up will continuously change, yet whatever policies are fought over, they 
will continue to represent a small number of competing ways of organizing and 
perceiving social relations. We can therefore use the theory to take a snapshot of the 
present state of the climate change-debate. 
The current positions in the debate on climate change can be read as three policy 
stories (three, because the fatalist solidarity has no voice; if it had it would not be 
fatalistic). Each policy story provides a setting (the basic assumptions), a villain (the 
policy problem), heroes (policy protagonists), and, of course, a moral (the policy 
solution). Each story emphasizes different aspects of the climate change issue. What is 
more, each story defines itself in contradistinction to the other policy stories. 
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Profligacy: an egalitarian story 
This story begins by pointing to the profligate consumption and production patterns of 
the North as the fundamental cause of global climate change. Rich industrialized 
countries, so the argument goes, are recklessly pillaging the world's resources with little 
regard to the wellbeing of either the planet or the peoples of its poorer regions. Global 
climate change is more than an issue that is amenable to quick technical fixes; it is a 
fundamentally moral and ethical issue. 
The setting for this story is a world in which everything is intricately connected to 
everything else, and nature is fragile. Whether this concerns human society or the natural 
world, this story urges us to think of Planet Earth as a single living entity. Environmental 
degradation, then, is also an attack on human wellbeing. Humans, so the argument goes, 
have, until now, successfully deluded themselves that they can live apart from the natural 
environment. In reality, however, there is no place for humans outside nature and thus no 
particular reason for considering humans as superior to nature. In short, this story is set in 
an ecocentric world. 
The villain, in the profligacy story, is the fundamentally inequitable structure of 
advanced industrial society. In particular, the profit motive and the obsession with 
economic growth –the driving forces of global capitalism– have not only brought us to 
the brink of ecological disaster; they have also distorted our understanding of both the 
natural and the social world. Global commerce and the advertising industry lead us to 
desire environmentally unsustainable products (bottled water, fast cars, or high protein 
foods, for example) while our real human needs (living in harmony with nature and with 
each other: the egalitarian social construction of human nature) go unfulfilled. What is 
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more, advanced capitalism distributes the spoils of global commerce highly inequitably. 
This is true within countries (the increasing gap between the rich classes and the poor 
classes) and among countries (the increasing gap between the affluent countries of the 
North and the destitute countries of the South). In short, prevailing structural inequalities 
have led to increasingly unsustainable patterns of consumption and production. 
Since everything is connected to everything else, this story continues, we cannot 
properly understand environmental degradation unless we see it as a symptom of this 
wider social malaise. The way humans pollute, degrade and destroy the natural world is 
merely a very visible indicator for the way they treat each other and particularly the 
weaker members of society. The logic that allows us to fell thousands of square 
kilometers of rainforests, to dump toxins in waterways, or pollute the air is precisely the 
same logic that produces racism, misogyny and xenophobia. Tackling one problem 
inevitably implies tackling all the others. 
The heroes of the profligacy story are those organizations and individuals who have 
managed to see through the chimera of progress in advanced industrial society. They are 
those groups and persons that understand that the fate of humans is inextricably linked to 
the fate of Planet Earth. The heroes understand that, in order to halt environmental 
degradation, we have to address the fundamental global inequities. In short, the heroes of 
the profligacy policy argument are those organizations of protest, such as Earth First! 
What, then, is the moral of the profligacy story? Its proponents point to a number of 
solutions. In terms of immediate policy, the profligacy tale urges us to adopt a strict 
version of the precautionary principle in all cases: unless policy actors can prove that a 
particular activity is innocuous to the environment, they should refrain from it. The 
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underlying idea here is that the environment is precariously balanced on the brink of a 
precipice. The story further calls for drastic cuts in carbon dioxide emissions; since the 
industrialized North produces most of these emissions, the onus is on advanced capitalist 
states to take action. 
Yet none of these measures, the story continues, is likely to be fruitful on its own. In 
order to really tackle the problem of global climate change those in the affluent North 
will have to fundamentally reform their political institutions and their unsustainable life-
styles. Rather than professionalized bureaucracies and huge centralized administrations, 
the advocates of the profligacy story suggest we decentralize decision-making down to 
the grassroots level. Rather than continuing to produce ever-increasing amounts of waste, 
we should aim at conserving the fragile natural resources we have: we should, in a word, 
move from the idea of a waste society to the concept of a conserve society. Only then can 
we meet real human needs. What are real human needs? Simple, they are the needs of 
Planet Earth. 
Earth First! provides a telling example. Here is how this group of ‘deep ecologists’ 
sees itself: 
To avoid co-option, we feel it is necessary to avoid the corporate organizational structure 
so readily embraced by many environmental groups. Earth First! is a movement, not an 
organization. Our structure is non-hierarchical. We have no highly-paid ‘professional 
staff’ or formal leadership. … Earth First! has survived attacks by moderates, would-be 
leaders and the agents of the system, remaining the most diverse, passionate, committed, 
and uncompromising group of environmental activists. 
Earth First! is a priority, not an organization. It is the name of our journal, and the slogan 
of our emerging tribe, but it is a tribe without chiefs. The only ‘leaders’ are those 
temporarily working the hardest and taking the most risks. New ideas, strategies and 
crucial initiative come from individuals, and all decisions are made within affinity groups 
based on preferred tactics. 
 
And this is how Earth First! sees the problem: 
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Over the last several hundred years, human civilization has declared war on large 
mammals, leading some respected ecologists to assert that the only large mammals to 
survive the near future will be those we humans choose to allow to live. Other prominent 
biologists, aghast at the wholesale devastation of tropical rainforests and temperate old-
growth forests, rapidly accelerating desertification, and destruction of ‘charismatic 
megafauna’ due to habitat destruction and poaching, say that Earth could lose one quarter 
to one third of all species within a very few years. 
Not only is the blitzkrieg against the natural world destroying ecosystems and their 
associated species, but our activities are now beginning to have fundamental, systemic 
effects upon the entire life-support system of the planet – upsetting the world's climate, 
poisoning the oceans, destroying the ozone layer which protects us from excessive 
ultraviolet radiation, changing the CO2 ratio in the atmosphere, and spreading acid rain, 
radioactive fallout, pesticides and industrial contamination throughout the biosphere.  
Clearly, the conservation battle is not one of merely protecting outdoor recreation 
opportunities; neither is it a matter of elitist aesthetics, nor ‘wise management and use’ of 
natural resources. It is a battle for life itself, for the continuous flow of evolution. We –
this generation of humans–  are at our most important juncture since we came out of the 
trees six million years ago. It is our decision, ours today, whether Earth continues to be a 
marvelously living, diverse oasis in the blackness of space, or whether the charismatic 
megafauna of the future will consist of Norway rats and cockroaches. To put it simply, 
the earth must come first. 
 
From this perspective, the solution seems clear: 
While many environmental groups are members of the American political establishment 
and essentially adopt the anthropocentric (human-centered) world view of industrial 
civilization, we say the ideas and manifestations of industrial civilization are anti-Earth, 
anti-woman, and anti-liberty. We are developing a new biocentric paradigm based on the 
intrinsic value of all natural things: Deep Ecology. Earth First! believes in wilderness for 
its own sake. Lobbying, lawsuits, letter writing and research papers are important and 
necessary. But they are not enough. Earth First!ers also use confrontation, guerrilla 
theater, direct action and civil disobedience to fight for wild places and life processes. 
And while we do not condone or condemn monkeywrenching, ecotage, or other forms of 
property destruction, we do present a forum for the exchange of ideas on creative 
opposition to the juggernaut of ‘progress’, including ideas about monkeywrenching.18
 
Similar opinions propel citizens’ groups such as Ecodefense, EcoEquity, Corpwatch, 
Adbusters, International Forum on Globalization, and the Voluntary Human Extinction 
Movement. They once used to drive Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the Natural 
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Resources Defense Council as well, but the internal organization and policy perspectives 
of these organizations have tended to become more hierarchical and technocratic over 
time – a road that Weber once dubbed the routinization of charisma.19 It has earned 
Friends of the Earth a spot on the ‘sell-out list’ of Ecodefense. 
 
Lack of global planning: a hierarchical story 
Our second story opens with a view on the limits to economic and population growth. In 
an older rendering of this story, a tale told some thirty years ago, these limits were 
supposed to lie in the dwindling resources of oil, gas and coal, which –scientific studies 
had conclusively shown– would not be sufficient to sustain the world’s economic growth 
forever more. Nowadays, after a thirty-year period in which ‘proven reserves’ of fossil 
fuels have continuously risen, different limits to economic and population growth are 
being highlighted. Rather than be afraid of natural resources running out, we should be 
concerned about the continued use of oil, gas and coal across the globe. Such 
irresponsible behavior, due to its long-term effects on the world’s climates, would 
eventually wreak havoc on the ecosystems on which human beings depend. 
 The operative term in this policy story is ‘long term’. Although human-made 
greenhouse gas-emissions have already started to affect ecosystems, there is still time to 
remedy matters. Unlike the profligacy-story, the hierarchical tale does not include the line 
that the world is about to come to an end unless we radically change our wicked capitalist 
ways right now. Enough time is left to plan a gradual, incremental change towards 
technologies and energy resources that do not emit greenhouse gases. Unfortunately, the 
‘long term’ also plays a less benign role in this tale. The consequences of climate change 
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lie far into the future, and are spread across the entire globe: way beyond the temporal 
and spatial kens of most citizens and enterprises. What is more, each single contribution 
that households, companies, and even whole countries could make to the prevention of 
climate change is so small as to be insignificant. It therefore makes no sense for any 
household or firm or country to unilaterally reduce its emissions. What we are faced with, 
therefore, is a ‘tragedy of the global commons’. This tragedy –in which undiscerning 
actors all over the world are slowly but surely crashing through the ecological limits 
established by experts– is the setting of the hierarchical story. 
 The underlying problem is the lack of global governance and planning that would 
rein in and steer global markets and protect global commons. Singled out for contempt as 
policy villains are those individuals, governments and enterprises skeptical of the view 
that the solution to global issues (such as climate change, biodiversity or international 
terrorism) must consist of global intergovernmental treaties, based on scientific planning 
and expert advice, and sanctified by the United Nations. In the case of global warming 
these would include: American President Bush, the U.S. Senate, the Australian 
government under Prime Minister John Howard, the government of Alberta. Scientists 
who argue against the climate change-thesis are put down as ‘politically motivated’, 
rather than objective and dispassionate. For instance, two economists recently argued that 
the scientific models predicting climate change that have been developed by the IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – the body of scientists advising the 
governments on global warming) greatly overestimate the economic growth rates that 
poor countries could possibly hope to attain during the course of the century. (Any such 
exaggeration would have the effect of overestimating future emissions of greenhouse 
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gases). Even the IPCC model that predicts the smallest degree of global warming 
assumes that in nearly a hundred years’ time the per capita income of the United States 
will be overtaken by South Africa, Libya, Algeria, North Korea and other currently near-
destitute countries. In reaction, scientists involved with the IPCC claimed that the two 
economists had read the false documents, had not understood the models and, anyway, 
were politically motivated. They did not, however, deny the basic criticism.20
 The moral of this tale is clear: the only conceivable remedy to climate change is 
for all the governments and parliaments of the world to formally agree on the extent to 
which future emissions should be cut, which countries should do so, how, and when. 
States should then impose these formal, intergovernmental agreements on the multitude 
of undiscerning consumers and producers within their borders. This is the logic behind 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. It is espoused by almost all the governments of the world, by U.N. agencies and 
the World Bank, as well as by the large mainstream environmental organizations (the 
ones of which Earth First! is so disparaging). 
 The heroes of this story are those dispassionate scientists, experts, civil servants, 
NGO representatives and enlightened politicians who have not put their talents and 
energy in the service of Mammon, but are quietly building the global bureaucratic 
structures that will rectify the short-termism and greed of global markets, and usher in the 
non-carbon age in a carefully planned and gradual manner. 
 Consider, for instance, the 1999 Human Development Report of the United 
Nations Development Programme (one of three international organizations administering 
the Global Environmental Facility, the main international source of funds for climate 
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change-projects). This report focuses on how to organize global governance. In its 
Overview, after having acknowledged (p. vii) the ‘intellectual advice and guidance by the 
external Advisory Panel of eminent experts’, the report states (p. 2):  
The challenge of globalization in the new century is not to stop the expansion of global 
markets. The challenge is to find the rules and institutions for stronger governance –local, 
national, regional and global– to preserve the advantages of global markets and 
competition, but also to provide enough space for human, community and environmental 
resources to ensure that globalization works for people – not just for profits. 
 
In the report’s final chapter, under the section heading ‘Start Now to Build the Global 
Architecture Required for the 21st Century’, the following conclusion is reached (pp. 110-
11): 
With the new challenges of globalization, and the need to ensure stronger action on old 
problems and new, the time has come to rethink the global architecture. Some of the key 
elements of an improved international architecture: 
• A stronger and more coherent UN system, with more commitment from all 
countries. 
• A global central bank. 
• A world investment trust with redistributive functions and transfer mechanism. 
• A world environment agency. 
• A revised World Trade Organization, fairer and with an expanded mandate. 
• An international criminal court, with a broader mandate for human rights. 
• A broadened United Nations, with a two-chamber General Assembly to allow for 
civil society representation. 
 
The 2003 Human Development Report has a chapter devoted to ‘Public Policies to 
Ensure Environmental Sustainability’. In this chapter, it is concluded that (p. 130): 
Intergovernmental processes tend to be difficult to organize and slow to execute, but they 
are the only realistic way to address cross-border pollution and ecosystem degradation. 
 
And (p. 131): 
A Life Observatory should be established to systematically monitor major ecosystems 
such as coastal habitats, major watersheds and wetlands. Such an observatory would 
complement current efforts, including the Global Terrestrial Observing System, the 
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Global Climate Change Observing System and the Global Oceans Observing System. 
The Life Observatory should build on the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a four-
year effort involving 1,500 scientists compiling the best available knowledge on the 
world’s ecosystems and the services they provide. The Life Observatory would ensure 
that these analyses are continuously updated to map the long-term effects of human 
activities on specific ecosystems. … Environmental indicators that accurately track the 
environment should be developed and integrated with national policy-making. Long-term 
planning should factor in projected changes in climate and changes to specific 
ecosystems to assess how these trends will affect development progress and needs. 
 
Much ado about nothing: an individualistic story 
Those who belong to organizations of a more individualistic bent –the United States’ 
Cato Institute, for instance, or Britain’s Institute of Economic Affairs, or the editorial 
teams of The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Times– tell a very different tale. 
To them, the whole current ballyhoo over climate change and global warming is much 
ado about nothing – at most just another attempt at scare-mongering by naïve idealists 
who erroneously believe that the world can be made a better place, and by international 
bureaucrats looking to expand their own budgets and influence. 
Such individualistically organized outfits are skeptical of the diagnosis of climate 
change itself and they are convinced that, even if it is correct, the consequences will be 
neither catastrophic nor uniformly negative. Far from being at a six-million-year juncture, 
we are, they assert, where we have always been: faced with uncertainties and challenges 
that, if tackled boldly by a diversity of competing agents, can be transformed into 
opportunities from which all can benefit. They focus on the lacunae in current climate-
change science: 
• Clouds, whose formation is poorly understood but which are expected to be more 
prevalent in a warmer world, would likely reflect more sunlight back into space 
before it reached the earth’s surface. 
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• Human sources of greenhouse gases are dwarfed by natural sources (volcanoes, 
for instance, and termites and other wood-digesting creatures) – which means that 
it is impossible in the short-run to say whether any warming (if it is happening) is 
man-made. 
• The climate models that are being used to predict future changes cannot even 
accurately chart changes that have already occurred. 
 
Looking beyond the short-term, they point out that a carbon-richer climate would 
increase agricultural productivity, and that, even if the negative impacts did outweigh the 
positive ones, we would still need to compare the costs of preventing global warming 
now to the costs of adapting to higher temperatures a few decades hence. Money not 
spent on preventing climate change, they point out, could be used to tackle other, more 
pressing environmental and social ills. On top of all that, individualistic organizations are 
open to the view that technological progress and the unpredictable forces of ‘creative 
destruction’ may soon render today’s fuss over climate change irrelevant. The production 
costs of renewable energy, they point out, have fallen dramatically over the last few 
decades, and these new technologies –wind, hydro, geothermal, and solar– are rapidly 
becoming (indeed, in some instances, have already become) competitive with the old 
technologies of fossil fuels. 
 The setting of this individualistic story is therefore a wonderfully robust and 
bountiful natural world, while the villains are those individuals and organizations too 
woolly-headed to grasp this simple fact, as well as those bureaucratic outfits that 
misrepresent matters in an attempt to increase their own clout. The heroes are those 
 22
decision-makers who brave public opposition and do not allow themselves to be 
intimidated by all this scare-mongering, the whistleblowers and skeptics in the 
community of atmospheric scientists, as well as those risk-taking individuals and 
enterprises that will soon make people forget all about climate change by inventing 
cleaner and cheaper technologies. The moral of this story is: business as usual – 
innovative business as usual! 
As Roger Bate, director of the Environment Unit of the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, concludes: 
On the whole, society’s problems and challenges are best dealt with by people and 
companies interacting with each other freely without interference from politicians and the 
state. We do not know whether the world is definitively warming, given recent satellite 
data. If the world is warming, we do not know what is causing the change – man or 
nature. We do not know whether a warmer world would be a good thing or a bad thing. 
[The scientific evidence] does not suggest that immediate action for significant limitation 
on energy consumption is urgently required. … Until the science of climate change is 
better understood, no government action should be undertaken beyond the elimination of 
subsidies and other distortions of the market.21
 
The Case for Clumsiness 
 
It is only by teasing out these sorts of policy arguments, and their diverse adherents, that 
we can understand the social constructions of needs and resources: how they are 
generated, how they are reproduced and transformed, and how they shape the policy 
process. This understanding has some important implications. 
 The three stories tell plausible but conflicting tales of climate change. All three tales 
use reason, logic and science to argue their points. None of the tales is ‘wrong’, in the 
sense of being implausible or incredible. Yet, at the same time, none of the stories is 
completely ‘right’; each argument focuses on those aspects of climate change for 
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which there is a suitable solution cast within the terms of a particular form of 
organization. 
 These three policy discourses are not reducible to one another. No one of the policy 
arguments is a close substitute for the others. Nor are any of the stories’ proponents 
ever likely to agree on the fundamental causes of and solutions to the global climate 
change issue. And, since these stories implicitly convey a normative argument, 
namely that of the good life (either in egalitarian enclaves, in hierarchies, or in 
markets), they are curiously immune to enlightenment by ‘scientific’ facts; we 
cannot, in any scientific sense, prove or falsify policy stories.22 
 These stories also define what sort of evidence counts as a legitimate fact and what 
type of knowledge is credible. The profligacy story discounts economic theory as the 
obfuscation of social inequalities and dismisses rational management as the 
reification of social relations. The tale of individual entrepreneurship views holistic 
eco-centrism as amateur pop-science and pours scorn on the naïve belief in benign 
control. Last, the global governance-story rejects laissez-faire economic theory as 
dangerously unrealistic, and questions the scientific foundations of more holistic 
approaches. 
 
This leaves us with a dynamic, plural and argumentative system of policy-definition and 
policy-framing that policy-makers ignore only at their cost, for three reasons. First, each 
policy story, as we have seen, thematises a pertinent aspect of the climate change debate. 
Any global climate change policy, then, based on only one or two of these stories, will 
merely provide a response to a specific aspect of the global climate change problem. It 
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will, in short, provide a partially effective response. Second, and more significantly, each 
of the stories represents a political voice in the policy process. Ignoring any of these 
voices means excluding them from policy-making. Within democratic polities, this 
inevitably leads to a loss of legitimacy. What is more, in democracies, dissenting voices 
will eventually force their way into the policy process (as we have seen for instance with 
the World Trade Organization in Seattle and Prague and the G8 riots in Genoa). Neither 
the cost of acrimonious and vicious political conflict, nor the loss of public trust 
experienced by those who (perhaps inadvertently, perhaps not) suppress dissenting 
voices, are particularly attractive. The former often leads to policy deadlock; the latter 
may well result in a legitimacy crisis in the polity as a whole. Last, even though these are 
contradictory and irreducible perspectives on policy, none of them can be effectively 
implemented on its own. Only innovative combinations of bureaucratic measures, risky 
entrepreneurship and technological progress, as well as frugality and international 
solidarity could be successful. 
The recent implosion of the Kyoto Protocol illustrates this latter point. In 
December 2003, the decade-long efforts to ratify and implement this treaty finally 
collapsed when it became clear that the Russian government would continue to oppose 
the Protocol. This meant, after the previous withdrawals by the governments of the 
United States and Australia, that the Kyoto Protocol would not receive the minimum 
amount of signatures necessary to enter into force. At the same time, it also became clear 
that very few of the countries that had ratified the treaty had actually been fulfilling their 
requirements under it. The Kyoto Protocol was doomed from the beginning, as it was 
based on the assumption that the prevention of climate change is an expensive, and global 
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‘public good’ that can only be provided through a formal, binding treaty between all the 
governments and parliaments of the world. However, very few, if indeed any, costly, 
global intergovernmental treaties have ever been ratified and implemented. Attempts to 
agree on such treaties usually get quickly bogged down, due the vast ideological 
differences between governments and the financial interests that are perceived to be at 
stake. The international attempts to stem climate change broke down, as they did not 
identify and promote competitive processes through which curbing climate change can 
become much less costly, or perhaps even turned into a profitable undertaking.23
So these three policy stories have important implications, not just for global climate 
change policy-making, but for policy, and for risk management, generally. 
 Endemic Conflict: In a policy process where politics matters (that is, in any policy 
process) there will be at least three divergent but plausible stories that frame the issue, 
define the problem, and suggest solutions. Thus conflict in policy-making processes 
is endemic, inevitable, and desirable, rather than pathological, curable or deviant. Any 
policy process that does not take this into account does so at the risk of losing 
political legitimacy. 
 Plural Policy Responses: We have seen that each story tells a plausible, but selective, 
story. Any policy response modeled solely in terms of just one or two of these tales 
will be, at best, partial and, at worst, irrelevant. 
 Quality of Communication: Since policy-making is inherently conflictual, and since 
effective policy responses depend on the participation of all three voices, policy 
outcomes crucially depend on the quality of the communication within the debate. A 
policy debate that can harness the argumentative conflict between different story-
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tellers will profit most from the potentially constructive interaction between different 
proponents. Conversely, a policy debate in which all three positions are sharply 
polarized will probably lead to policy deadlock. This is a structural argument that 
concerns the implicit and explicit ‘rules’ that govern policy deliberation in a polity. If 
the ‘rules of the game’ permit or even force policy actors to take seriously different 
types of stories, then what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith call ‘policy-oriented learning’ 
can take place.24 If this is not the case, then the policy debate will be an 
unconstructive dialogue of the deaf. 
 
Summarizing all of the above, we have at one extreme an unresponsive monologue and at 
the other a shouting match amongst the totally deaf. Between these extremes we 
occasionally find a vibrant multivocality in which each voice formulates its view as 
persuasively as possible, sensitive to the knowledge that others are likely to disagree, and 
acknowledging a responsibility to listen to what the others are saying. This is the 
condition –clumsiness– we must strive for if we value democracy or, as is the case with 
many regulatory agencies, we are mandated to develop and implement policy on behalf 
of a democracy. Getting there and staying there is, of course, not easy. 
At the monologue end of the spectrum the policy process is seductively elegant and 
reassuringly free (it would seem) from the defiling intrusion of politics. Here we find the 
mind-set characterized by single-metric rationality. At the other extreme we wallow in 
the incoherence of complete relativism. The cultural theory typology presented here 
suggests that between these extremes there is the possibility of constructive dialogue. It 
will often be a noisy, discordant, contradictory dialogue, but this is the clumsy beast that 
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democratic policy makers and regulators must seek to harness and ride – in each and 
every specific situation. On this we agree again with Isaiah Berlin: 
The way out must therefore lie in some logically untidy, flexible and even ambiguous 
compromise. Every situation calls for its own specific policy, since ‘out of the crooked 
timber of humanity’, as Kant once remarked, ‘no straight thing was ever made’. What the 
age calls for is not (as we are so often told) more faith, or stronger leadership, or more 
scientific organization. Rather it is the opposite – less Messianic ardour, more 
enlightened skepticism, more toleration of idiosyncracies, more frequent ad hoc measures 
to achieve aims in a foreseeable future… What is required is a less mechanical, less 
fanatical application of general principles, however rational or righteous, a more cautious 
and less arrogantly self-confident application of accepted, scientifically tested, general 
solutions to unexamined individual cases.25
 
Making Ourselves Clumsy 
 
The term ‘clumsy institution’ was coined by law professor Michael Shapiro as a way of 
escaping from the idea that, when we are faced with contradictory definitions of problem 
and solution, we must choose one and reject the rest.26 Clumsy institutions, we can say, 
now that we have the cultural theory-typology, are those institutional arrangements in 
which none of the voices –the hierarchical call for ‘wise guidance and careful 
stewardship’, the individualistic emphasis on ‘entrepreneurship and technological 
progress’, the egalitarian insistence that we need ‘a whole new relationship with nature’, 
and the fatalist's asking ‘why bother?’– is excluded, and in which the contestation is 
harnessed to constructive, if noisy, argumentation. 
Clumsiness emerges as preferable to elegance (optimizing around just one of the 
definitions of the problem and, in the process, silencing the other voices) once we realize 
that what looks like irreconcilable contradiction is, in fact, essential contestation.27 From 
the reflexive vantage point that is afforded us by our fourfold typology, and with the 
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benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that many of our public institutions –Britain's former 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the World Trade Organization, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and most national overseas aid agencies, to 
mention but a few– are insufficiently clumsy and, in consequence, erosive of democracy. 
Most policy tools (all single metrics such as cost-benefit analysis, probabilistic risk 
assessment, quality-adjusted life years, general equilibrium modelling) and policy 
precepts (the insistence on a single agreed definition of the problem, the clear separation 
of facts and values, and the focus on optimisation) are similarly flawed. 
 The challenge is therefore how clumsy solutions can best be generated within 
specific circumstances. We can only give a clumsy answer to this. Each of the active 
ways of organizing lends itself to a particular preference for how clumsy solutions can be 
arrived at. In each particular situation, an appropriate and flexible combination of these 
alternative perspectives needs to be forged. The egalitarian ideal for making ourselves 
clumsy would be through participatory, deliberative practices. Everybody involved 
should deliberate freely –from their own perspectives on the good life– until solutions are 
found on which all can agree. No participant in this deliberative debate should have more 
power resources (for instance in the form of superior rhetorical skills, more information 
or better training) than the others, and nobody should be aiming to promote their private 
interests in the public debate.28 The hierarchical take on how to generate clumsiness 
would start from the assumption that ordinary citizens and organizations are simply not 
well-informed or well-meaning enough to be able to grasp, and balance, all these rather 
sophisticated, alternative rationales. Instead clumsiness can only be reached, when 
policy-makers and scientific experts carefully listen to ordinary folk arguing from their 
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partial perspectives, weigh the evidence, weed out the good arguments from the bad, and 
then construct clumsy solutions in a top-down way.29 The individualistic view would 
stress that clumsiness can only be reached in an unplanned and antagonistic way. This 
view would call for checks and balances between people and organizations adhering to 
different rationalities. As long as the latter would be forced to respond –through the rules 
of the game– to each other’s criticisms, and show that the accusations hurled at them are 
unfounded, clumsy solutions could arise in spontaneous, unintended ways, which would 
not require any form of consensus on any aspect of the issue.30 Therefore, different ideals 
for how to make ourselves clumsy can be derived from the various ways of organizing 
and perceiving, none of which will be successful on its own.31
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